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THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND PRIVATE LAW
IN THE TUDOR AND STUART PERIODS: I*

John P. Dawsont
T has been often said that the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in England were pre-eminently the age of conciliar government. The activities_ of the Tudor Privy Council extended into
every phase of national life and were responsible, more than any other
single factor, for the effective organization of an English national state.
These activities continued under the first two Stuarts, with no break
in institutional development, though they widened the gulf between
Crown and people and hastened a revolution.
Among the diversified functions assumed by the Privy Council, an
important group related to the administration of private law. This
aspect has received attention from historians of English law.1 A detailed
review of the evidence at this late stage can be justified only by the
interest and difficulty of the questions raised and the light they may
throw on prevailing attitudes toward law and politics.
The subject gains added interest if one glances at times to contemporary developments in France. In France, as in England, the re-establishment of royal authority came toward the end of the fifteenth century, after prolonged exhaustion through civil war. The agency for
reconstruction in France was not quite to the same degree a conciliar
group of royal ministers, organized for collective action. But the reconstruction of the monarchy in France was marked, near the end of
the fifteenth century, by the organization of a judicial branch of the

I

"" This article was originally written for the collection of essays in honor of Max Radin,
being published under the editorship of Douglas Maggs. Work on it was interrupted and the
final text could not be prepared in time. It is nevertheless intended to honor him and all his
many works.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
l ChieHy in 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 492-508; 4 id. 60-108; 5 id.
155-214 (1922).
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Privy Council, known as the Grand Conseil, with wide powers of review over lower courts, an elaborate and formal procedure, and a
separate personnel. Within a century this tribunal was completely
overshadowed by another branch from the same central stem, appropriating to itself the title of Conseil Prive, with powers even wider and
a far greater prestige. From these two institutions together were derived
the system of appellate review, which was to survive into modem
French law. 2 Their practice in controlling the operations of royal officials provided useful background for the system of administrative responsibility that was organized in the nineteenth century as the French
system of administrative law. In the later stages of the Ancien Regime
the Conseil Prive also provided an essential instrument for the centralized bureaucratic state to which French political institutions were
molded in the course of the seventeenth century.
The ultimate fate of the royal councils as instruments of government was to depend, in both France and England, on the solution of
great constitutional issues, eventually through civil war. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when the outcome was still
in doubt, the relations of the royal councils to existing systems of private
law raised some of the questions involved in that great debate. In both
countries the constant intrusion of political agencies into the administration of justice presents problems both as to the motives of royal
policy and the limits of royal power.
It is the record of English experience that will be reviewed here.
French parallels will be referred to only incidentally.

A. The Power of the Crown to Create Judicial Agencies
The powers of the Tudor Privy Council in relation to private
litigation were a late phase in a continuous process of growth and resistance, which begins at an early stage of English institutional history.
The main story is familil:lr. But it is a story of permanent interest, from
which much can still be learned.
In the sixteenth century, the power of the Crown to generate new
judicial functions had been proved in comparatively recent experience.
For men of the Tudor period the origins of the Court of Common
Pleas were shrouded in obscurity, though it is worth recalling now
that the remedies that Court administered in the thirteenth century
were as drastic a disruption of existing institutions as the prerogative
2 Cm!NoN, 0ruGINI!S, CoNDITIONS ET EFFETS DE LA CASSATION

24-44 (1882).
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justice of later centuries. The Court of Common Pleas had scarcely
been organized when the power of the Crown was again expressed in
the Council around the King. This court, which came to be known
as the King's Bench, retained for long the wide powers and prestige
which it owed to its more recent origin. It was not till the fourteenth
century that the separation of the King's Bench from the Council became clear and its extraordinary powers were for the most part abandoned.3 The growth of the Chancery jurisdiction is also well knownthe gradual differentiation of function, still unclear in the fifteenth
century; the Parliamentary attacks on the Great Seal and Privy Seal;
the firmness and occasional evasion with which the powers of the
Crown were maintained. Less significant for most home-dwelling
Englishmen, but a special object of the common lawyers' hostility,
was the Court of Admiralty, whose powers can be traced even earlier
than the fifteenth century and were derived from the same essential
source.4 Then, near the end of the fifteenth century, came resumption
of judicial powers by the Council itself, chiefly through the Court of
Star Chamber. At the same time a new growth appeared in the Court
of Requests, whose derivation from the Council was clear, but whose
youth was to leave it perilously exposed in the great winds of the
seventeenth century. To these must be added, finally, the proliferation of courts that continued to emerge through the sixteenth century
-the Council in the North, the Council in Wales, the High Commission, not to speak of statutory creations like the Court of Wards and
the Court of Augmentations.
In judicial functions, as in the administrative powers of royal officials, these impulses toward growth had been met in each case by new
resistance, which aimed to arrest and contain them. 5 As new functions
became organized they generated their own routines; the routines became invested with an imperative and became "law" or almost-law; as
action then was hampered, the central institutions of the monarchy
reasserted their power to override restraints and create new functions,
which in their tum built into regularity and became ''law" or almost-law.
a 1 HoLDswoRTH, HisTORY oP ENcusH I.Aw 209-211 (1922).
4 Laing, "Historic Origins of Admiralty Jurisdiction in England," 45 J.\,hc11. L. R:Bv.
163 (1946); MARsDE~, SELECT PLEAS IN THE CouRT OP ADMIRALTY (Selden Society)
vol. I, xiv-Iii.
Ii The parallels in administrative development, centering in the battle for the control of
the royal seals, are suggested by the studies of Tout, whose general thesis is outlined in his
CHAPTERS IN Mm>ravAL ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, vol. 1, 18-31 (1920).
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That the cycles were still recurring through the course of the sixteenth
century was evident to any observer. But the conquest of new powers
by the monarchy and the multiplication of its functions gave great
weight to its broader claims. By the sixteenth century the power of
political authority had cut deep into English society. If resistance was
to continue it would have to be mobilized soon, and on a scale commensurate with the power already acquired by the Crown.
The new judicial functions also meant a multiplicity of agencies,
both in the central administration and in local government. In the
bewildering maze of courts and functionaries it is difficult to work one's
way from a distance in time of four hundred years. Even to those who
lived with these institutions and had seen new functions grow out of
the medieval inheritance, there was room for uncertainty and conllict. 6
A system so complex and irrational could only be made to work by
strong wills at the center, reaching out through all phases of English
society. For the assertion of power that this involved, it was necessary
also to have a central principle. This principle was at hand in the
authority of the Crown, continually reasserted through earlier centuries
and quite adequate for its new tasks.

B.

Relations of the Council and Star Chamber

Modern scholarship has succeeded in rehabilitating the reputation
of the Star Chamber and establishing the legality of its wide powers.
It must be said for Coke that he did not join in the falsification of
history which attributed the authority of the Star Chamber to the
statute of 1487.7 The evidence is overwhelming that it antedates the
statute, that it never considered itself restricted to the powers defined
in the statute, and that it remained a branch of the Council till it was
abolished in 1641. Though Bacon is no doubt suspect as a witness,
we must accept his testimony that "the high and preeminent power"
had always been reserved to the Council "in causes that might in
example or consequence concern the state of the commonwealth."8
It is equally clear that the differentiation between Council and
Star Chamber was a gradual process that continued throughout the
6 A lively account of the jostling of courts, viewed from a local setting, appears in
Willcox, "Lawyers and Litigants in Stuart England, a County Sample," 24 CoRN. L. Q. 533
(1939).
7 CoKB, FotmTH lNSTITaTB 62-3.
8 BACON, HisTORY 011 HENRY VII, WoRKS, (Spedding ed.), vol. VI 85 (1622), Evidence on the whole subject is fully reviewed in I HoLDSWORTH, HisTORY 011 ENGLISH LAw
492-497, 512-516 (1922).
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sixteenth century. Under the earlier Tudors, for example, the Star
Chamber retained a considerable civil jurisdiction, which survived
into the seventeenth century as a power to award civil remedies to
persons injured by crime.9 The concentration on major crime as the
main concern of the Star Chamber was as gradual as the organization
of its procedure, the development of a specialized staff, and the subjection of its proceedings to rule. As men of the sixteenth century relived an old experience, so often repeated before, it became possible
for them to consider the Star Chamber a "court." Indeed it was a
court. The Chancellor presided and some common lawyers were always members, along with the lords of the Council. Its sittings became
regular and term times were observed.10 Its procedure became dilatory,
as in any other court. But it also remained the Council, whose powers
came direct from the King. To this it owed its pre-eminence as "the
most honorable court ( our Parliament excepted) that is in the Christian world."11
When the registers of the Tudor Privy Council commence, in
1540,1 2 they make it abundantly clear that the Council itself, not sitting in the Star Chamber or organized as a formal court, still retained
9 HUDSON, A TREATISE OP THE CoURT OP STAR CHAMBER 55-61, in 2 HARGRAVE,
CoLLECTANEA ]UBIDICA. On the practice of awarding civil remedies as an incident to criminal punishment, fuwARDE, REPORTES DEL CAsEs IN CAMERA STELLATA, 323, gives confirmation (citing Ellesmere in 1607).
_
10 Sir Thomas Smith is explicit on this in 3 CoMMONWEALTH, c. 4 (1583). HUDSON,
TREATISE ON THE STAR CHAMBER 219, in 2 HARcRAVB, CoLLECTANEA ]URIDICIA, indicates
that regular days of sitting go back to the early years of Henry VllI.
That the Council itself drew some distinction is indicated by its rebuke to a suitor who
had instituted proceedings in the Star Chamber after filing a complaint before the Council.
The register of the Council records its view that no action begun before it may "be removed
to any other Coourte." Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council VI, 405 (1570).
11 Co:ira, FounTH lNsnTUTE 65. Many examples can be given of the distinction between the criminal justice of ordinary common law courts and the extraordinary justice of the
Star Chamber. For example, CoKE, 4 REPORTS, 160, comments on the absence of any common law liability for intent to murder without act: "altho' for such Conspiracy he might be
punished in the Star Chamber, that is by the absolute Power of the Court, and not by the
ordinary Course of the Law." In Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, XXII, 6Q (1591), the
Council directed the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas to punish an attorney who fraudulently entered a plea of nil elicit on behalf of his client and ''Yf your authoritie shall not be
sufficiente to performe the same," to report the case to the Star Chamber so that it might
proceed against the attorney.
1 2 Before 1540 the Council registers were maintained only intermittently. The series
that will be principally relied on in the following discussion is that originating in the Council
resolution of Aug. IO, 1540, and continuing with only occasional gaps until 1641. The register for the years 1540-1542 was edited by Nicolas, appearing as volume 7 of his series, and
will be cited by his name. The register for the rest of the Tudor period was edited by Dasent
and will be cited by his name. The register for the period 1603-1641 has so far been published only through the end of 1626; it will be cited A.P.C., followed by the years of the
volume in question.
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power to deal with criminal matters. Its greatest energy was shown in
~acking down political or religious dissent, for which the standard
remedy was imprisonment at the Council's pleasure.13 It was also much
concerned with those eruptions of private violence which had marked
the disordered society of the fifteenth century and which the Tudors
were determined to control.14 The power to imprison was also exercised
in other miscellaneous offenses and was even delegated to special commissions appointed by the Council to examine charges of crime.16
In the reign of Elizabeth, the activities of the Council, not sitting
as the Star Chamber, in direct enforcement of the criminal law were
steadily reduced. After 1560 few instances can be found of direct intervention through summary trial of offenders. This restriction of
the Council's activity may have been influenced somewhat by some
general ideas as to the proper limits of its functions in matters so directly
affecting the liberty and welfare of the subject.16 But the Council
registers in the later years of Elizabeth are full of orders for summary
apprehension of public offenders, with a view to trial by some other
agency. The Council retained broad responsibility for the preservation
of public order, reflected in instructions for surrender of property seized
through forcible entry, orders for preliminary examination of suspected
criminals, and direct assistance to the process of ordinary courts.1 7 In
18 Dasent I 462, 464, 492 (1546); III 32, 151, 163, 206, 237, 267, 272, 275 (15501551); IV 13 (1552). It would be difficult for the accused to choose between the imprisonment ordered in these instances and the use of the pillory involved in Dasent I 390 (1546),
where it was provided that the ear of the victim was to be nailed to the pillory, there "to
remayne till he shuld himself either cut it of or pul it of." The pillory of course was often
used with smaller fry.
·
14 Nicolas VII 45, llO, 115, 143 (1540-1541); Dasent I 289 (1545); II 147 (1547);
III 244, 246, 251, 312 (1551); IV 38 (1552).
15 Robbery: Nicolas, VII 152, 153 (1541); Dasent III 375 (1551); counterfeiting:
Dasent III 109 (1550); VII 97 (1559); "invectives" between persons attending court:
Nicolas VII 105, 107 (1540). Delegation of the power to imprison: Dasent VI 117 (1557);
VII 47, 84, 97, 113 (1559 and 1562). Banishment was also ordered for a person found
guilty of "naughtie lyving and develish practises" (Nicolas VII 105, 107); the pillory with
nailing of ears for a broker found guilty of fraud (Dasent I 38).
10 Such ideas are implied, for example, in the case of one Bolton, who had already been
imprisoned by order of the Council for "lewde, sclaunderous wordes" against the Lord
Keeper. The Council gave order that the common law judges were to be asked "for their
opynyones what the lawe hath determyned herein." That the Council did not consider
itself restricted to the sanctions imposed by the common law is shown by the further order
that if the law provided no penalty Bolton was to be put twice on the pillory. Dasent VII
218 (1565).
17 lliustrations of the numerous orders for restitution of property forcibly seized: Dasent
VIII 347 (1575); X 336 (1578); XIV 63, 81 (1586); A.P.C. 1621-3, 309 (1623); A.P.C.
1623-5, 170 (1624). Orders setting up special commissions for preliminary examination of
crime appear in very large numbers in the reign of Elizabeth. Assistance to process of lower
courts will be referred to below, note 25.
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disorders likely to lead to public scandal, as in abductions occurring in
connection with family disputes, the Council continued to assert its
authority for some decades, as Coke himself was to discover in 1617.18
Throughout the latter half of the sixteenth century, an increasingly
clear line was being drawn between the functions of judicial trial of
criminal cases before the Council in the Star Chamber and administrative action in the general interest of public order and security.19 But
the connection between these functions was continuous till at least the
end of the century. The Star Chamber itself, from which the "court"
derived its name, was merely a room in which the Council often sat
when its members assembled in London. The examinations of offenders, which were frequently ordered by the Council under Elizabeth,
must certainly have been intended in some cases to provide a foundation for judicial proceedings in the Star Chamber. Interim orders in
aid of the Star Chamber appear in a variety of forms. 20 It must have
been evident enough to ordinary Englishmen that the lords of the
Council spoke with the same voices, whichever hats they wore.
Activities of the Council in the field of major crime represent only
one aspect of its broad authority in all areas of public administration.
By the end of the sixteenth century, it is true, the judicial function in
criminal cases had been gradually separated from its powers in general
administration. But within quite recent history, the power to try and
to punish for crime had been exercised by the Council without much
18 Abduction cases: Dasent IX 363, 338 (1577); XI 56, 79 (1579); XII 281 (1580);
XV 116 (1587); XVI 147 (1588); XIX 196 (1590); XXXII 109 (1601). Coke's difficulties with the Privy Council over his abduction of his daughter from the custody of Lady
Hatton in 1617, leading to a warrant from the Council for his surrender of the daughter, are
described by LYON AND BLoCK, EDwARD CoKE, ORACLE oF nm LAw 247-258 (1929).
19 As early as 1546, for example, a recusant who remained obstinate after long argument
was ordered indicted "but not arrayned til an other day they shold eftsones sit for those
maters." Dasent I 495 (1546). In 1558 the Council "consydred and agreyd uppon" the
fines of certain offenders which were to be "determyned to morrowe in the Starre Chamber."
Dasent VI 316 (1558). A suit before the Council was dismissed in 1589 on the ground that
the case was pending before the Star Chamber "where the same is to receave tryall." Dasent
XVIII 195 (1589). Similarly, Dasent XIV 346 (1587).
20 Directions to the law officers of the Crown to draw up bills in the Star Chamber after
hearing the issues raised by private complaint to the Council: Dasent VII 169 (1564); XVI
366 (1588).
Recognisance extracted from private persons to appear on a day assigned for hearing in
the Star Chamber: Dasent XI 134 (1579).
Interim orders for safe custody of land or goods pending hearing in the Star Chamber:
Nicolas VII 58 (1540) and 223 (1541); Dasent XIV 330 (1587); XV 205 (1587); XX
303 (1591).
Common law judges ordered to stay common law proceedings pending decision in the
Star Chamber of the issues involved: Dasent VIII 183 (1574); XX 37 (1590); A.P.C. 161921, 267 (1620).
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attention to any formal distinctions. In any case, the lords of the Council could very quickly transform themselves into a tribunal possessing,
with unquestioned legal authority, the highest coercive powers of the
state. The marking off of function was no surrender of power.
C.

Principal Areas of Activity in Connection With Civil Litigation
1.

Supervision of the Administration of Justice

The supervision exercised by the Privy Council over the administration of justice was merely another symptom of its watchful care
for the good order of English society. This care included all phases of
central and local administration. The established courts could hardly
have been exempt.
One objective of the Council's work was to ensure impartiality in
judicial administration. With judicial and executive functions so
largely entrusted to local gentry, employed part-time and with limited
training, it was inevitable that family connections, local influence and
even bribery should present major problems to the Elizabethan Council. Where judicial officers were suspected on one or another of these
grounds, the Council arranged a change of venue or the substitution
of another judge.21 Juries and executive officers of the courts were
likewise susceptible to local influences, and special precautions were
needed against partiality or corruption.22
The Council aimed not merely at honesty but also at greater efficiency in judicial administration. It received and acted on numerous
complaints at the delays in ordinary litigation. Directions to speed up
decision of pending cases were addressed to substantially all the established courts of law and equity.23 Instructions were issued to lower
21 Dasent II 487 (1547); XXI 102, 115 (1591); XXIX 226, 299, 584 (1598-9);
XXX 36 (1600). In Dasent XXII 360 (1592), a judgment by default procured by local
influence was ordered set aside. In the famous case of Manwood, Chief Baron of the
Exchequer, extensive hearings before the Council established his guilt of corruption and led
to orders for his removal from office and for restitution of the property extorted by him from
a litigant. Dasent XIX 316, 358, 424; XX 219; XXII 449, 450 (1590-2); discussed m
1 HoLDswoRTH, HrsTORY oP ENGLISH LAw 505 (1922).
22 Charges of partiality of jurors led to orders for changes of venue (Dasent XV 377;
XXV 150) or special instructions to the judges to ensure fair trial (Dasent XX 299; XXII
554; XXV 238; A.P.C. 1613-14, 505).
Complaints against sheriffs, bailiffs, and other executive officials of the courts led to
warnings directed to the officials themselves (Dasent XII 279; XIII 141; XIX 470; XX 122)
or to inquiries through judicial officers or special commissions of the Council (Dasent XI 83;
XII 288; XVIII 191; XIX 397; XX 57; XXX 637).
23 Queen's Bench: Dasent XIV 298 (1587); XX 26 (1590); XXI 95 (1591). Other
common law courts: Dasent XVI 307 (1588); XXII 528 (1592). Justices of Assize: Dasent
XI 59 (1579); XX 261, 285 (1591). Chancery: Dasent XXII 144, 235, 250, 400, 494,
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courts in many forms, aiming to simplify the handling of cases and
remove minor procedural handicaps. 24 Perhaps efficiency was also the
object in assisting the enforcement of lower court process, though in
these cases there also entered the motive of vindicating the authority
of the Crown. In any case, the Council under Elizabeth at one time
or another lent its authority and the aid of its officers in support of
the process of most of the central courts.25
•
Another important motive for the Council's intervention was to
resolve the conflicts of jurisdiction which became more acute toward
the end of the sixteenth century, as the common lawyers developed
means for resisting the growth of prerogative courts. The great casus
belli was the Admiralty. Its alien doctrine made it a special object
of dislike for the common lawyers. Its useful services in cases of foreign
merchants gave the Council a special interest in protecting it from
attack. Common law writs of prohibition and supersedeas, directed
against the Admiralty, had begun to appear in the middle years of
Henry VIII and became frequent under Elizabeth and James l.26 In
1558 the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench went so far as to attach
the person of the Admiralty Judge, and it required a hearing before the
Council and its specific order to secure the Judge's release. 27 In later
495 (1591-2). Irish Chancexy: Dasent XXV 117 (1595). Council in Wales: Dasent XVII
177 (1589). Dean of Arches: Dasent IX 39 (1575). Admiralty: Dasent ill 434 (1554);
V 250 (1555); vm 34 (1571); X 278 (1578); XI 131 (1579); XIV 167 (1586); XVII 48
(1589); XVIII 72 (1589); XXV 400 (1596); A.P.C. 1613-14, 153 (1613).
For similar motives, witnesses already served with process were directed to appear and
testify in pending common law actions, in Dasent ill 409 (1551).
24 Consolidation ordered of two separate actions involving same parties: Dasent XVI
118 (1588); stay of action ordered so that defendant may secure needed evidence: Dasent
XX 327 (1591); instructions not to require unnecessary sureties for good behavior in pending
common law action: Dasent XI 29 (1578); Queen's Bench ordered not to issue process on
recognizance to prosecute writ of error with due diligence, where judgment was not entered
on writ of error through fault of clerk: Dasent XV 84 (1587).
25 Queen's Bench: Dasent XIlI, 117 (1581), this case involving aid in enforcing the
judgment recovered by Henry Shelley the previous Trinity term (CoKE, FmST REP., 93b)
against his uncle Richard-the Shelleys of Shelley's Case. Other common law judgments:
Dasent ill, 321, 323 (1551); XII 3 (1580); XXVI 29 (1596); XXXI 88 (1601). Star
Chamber: Dasent XXV 92, 128 (1595). Chancexy: Dasent XVI 324 (1588); XXII 223
(1592); XXIV 181 (1593). High Commission: Dasent IX 155 (1576). Council in Wales:
Dasent X 206 (1578). Admiralty: Dasent VII 209, 222, 255, 272 (1565); vm 27, 47,
81, 251, 374 (1571-5); IX 80, 84, 115, 232, 269 (1576); X 186, 256, 314, 349, 366, 441
(1578); XI 3, 44, 68, 184 (1579); xm 81 (1581); XIV 329, 339 (1587); xvm 66
(1589); XX 183 (1590); XXVII 167 (1597); XXX 649 (1600); A.P.C. 1613-14, 130,
325 (1613); A.P.C. 1615-16, 536 (1616).
26 MAnsnEN, SELECT CAS:ss IN THI! CoURT OF ADMIRALTY (Selden Society) vol. I,
lxxiii-lxxvili; vol. II, xlii-lvii, the latter passage listing more than thirty prohibitions issued
between 1531 and 1603.
21 Dasent VII 12 (1558).
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years the Council frequently expressed its displeasure at the delays
produced by prohibitions and their serious effects in undermining the
Admiralty's authority. On several occasions the common law judges
were expressly forbidden to issue prohibitions in future. 28 The courage
of the common law judges in ignoring such explicit commands was a
measure of their determination.
Similar issues were raised in the struggle over the Court of Requests, which encountered vigorous attack long before Coke's advent
to the bench. The registers of the Council record many examples of
intervention by the Council in aid of process from the Court of Requests. 29 The strong support given at the height of the conflict, in
the last decade of the sixteenth century, undoubtedly helped to ensure
survival of the Court of Requests until I 641, when the Council's own
jurisdiction in private disputes was abolished. 30
Quite apart from its defense of the Crown's authority through protection to prerogative courts, the Council undertook to regulate the
competition between courts, in the interest of orderly administration.
Its intervention in the reign of Elizabeth was never systematic; the
number of such orders is not large.31 They suggest a function, however, as a tribunal des con-flits for which there was real need.
The reigns of the early Stuarts brought a decrease in the Council's
activity in supervising the administration of justice. Enough remained,
however, to make it clear that this change involved no surrender to
a basic principle of limitation. 32 The personal intervention of James I
2s Dasent XIV 317 (1587); XV 314 (1587); XXVII 180 (1597); XXIX 367 (1598).

In Dasent XXX 43 (1600), is the report of a Council order appointing Coke, then Attorney
General, and Bacon to draw up a definition of the Admiralty jurisdiction which would
eliminate "the greate and intollerable delayes" caused by prohibitions from the Queen's
Bench and Common Pleas.
29 Dasent VIII 27 (1571); IX 379 (1578); XIV 105 (1586); XVIII 248 (1598);
XIX 31 (1590); XX 50, 72, 100 (1590); XXI 218 (1591); XXII 70, 165 (1591);
XXIV 263 (1593); XXV 114 (1595); XXVI 92 (1596); XXVIII 226 (1598).
30 LEADAM, SELECT CASES IN nm CotmT OF Re.QUESTS (Selden Society) xxxvii.
31 Dispute between Town of Chester and Exchequer Court at Chester: Dasent VIII
223 (1574); between Council in Wales and City and County of Worcester: Dasent VIII
236 (1574); Council in Wales forbidden to enjoin actions in Chancery, Common Pleas and
Star Chamber: Dasent XII 27 (1580); Court of Delegates rebuked for reviewing decisions
of Admiralty and High Commission: Dasent XXII 268 (1592); Chief Justice of Common
Pleas ordered to secure stay of actions to arrest process server of Council in North: Dasent
XXV 485 (1596); dispute between Council in North and Mayor of Berwick: Dasent XXX
718 (1600).
32 Change of venue ordered if allegations of local influence well founded: A.P.C. 161314, 109 (1613); order to set aside verdict obtained in Irish court through local influence:
A.P.C. 1613-14, 405 (1614); instructions to Justices of Assize to ensure fair trial for widow
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in the seventeenth century conB.ict of courts was the result of his own
clear recognition that debates as to the power of judicature involved
a challenge to powers of the Crown on which concessions were dangerous. The result was to relieve the Council of a burdensome responsibility, but the issues were thereby raised to a higher level of conB.ict
and a mediating influence supplied by the Elizabethan Council was
removed. 33
If the powers exercised by the Council under Elizabeth had been
enlarged and organized, a development might have occurred along
lines parallel to those in France. There the Grand Conseil, through
the earlier part of the sixteenth century, and the Conseil Prive, from
the end of the sixteenth century, assumed responsibility for general
supervision of the administration of justice. This responsibility was
rapidly channeled in two main directions-attempts to ensure impartiality in judicial officers and the resolution of jurisdictional conB.icts.
The first of these, under the influence of Roman law doctrine, took
shape as the formal recusation de juges, which proved practically to
be of considerable importance and which became the solution in modem French law of the problem of influence or partiality in judicial
officers.34 The responsibility for dealing with jurisdictional conB.icts
among lower courts was also an important phase in the work of the
Conseil Prive and helped to shape the modem powers and functions
of the Gour de Cassation. It is entirely clear that some agency of this
type was needed to bring order into the patchwork system of Tudor
and Stuart courts. By such means, for example, it might have been
possible to accomplish a gradual fusion of law and equity as was done in
Scotland with the aid of the Scotch Privy Council. It was the partial
success of the common lawyers, under the leadership of Coke, in asserting their own control over assignments of judicial power, that
warned off the Council from a complex and tedious, but most necessary

task.
suing an adversary "of greate power and creditt in his count:cy": A.P.C. 1618-19, 218 (1618);
attorneys and subordinate officers of the Common Pleas ordered not to proceed with suits
concerning matters in exclusive jurisdiction of the Marshall's Court: A.P.C. 1621-3, 267
(1622).
33 For example, in the case of Parsons v. Locke, which involved the most direct of the
attacks on the Court of Requests, the Council referred the whole case to Egerton, then
Attorney General, and the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, who both reported in favor
of the Court of Requests. As a result the Council ordered Parsons imprisoned if he continued
his disobedience of the order of the Court of Requests. Dasent XXVI 92 (1596).
84 Putnam, "Recusation," 9 CoRN. L.Q. l (1923).
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Assistance to and Protection of Royal Servants

In the whole field of the Council's intervention in private controversies, a considerable share was represented by assistance and protection to royal officers. The rapid growth in ·state functions and the
limited supply of experienced personnel made it necessary to provide
some system of rewards for faithful service. One important form of
reward was assistance to royal officers who became involved in private
litigation.
In many instances the aid of the Council involved no direct interference with lawsuits brought or threatened. For example, private
individuals were instructed by letters from the Council to perform their
obligations owed to servants of the Crown or else show cause to the
contrary before the Council.35 More often the Council directed its
instructions to judicial officers or arbitration commissions, with the
object of aiding in the enforcement of judgments recovered by Crown
servants, mediating with their creditors for settlement of their obligations, or attempting by persuasion to secure their release from civil
arrest. 36 As will be indicated later, similar assistance was given to
persons not Crown servants; the most that can be said is that past· or
35 Nicolas VII 214, 218, 221 (1541); Dasent VIII 332 (1575); X 242 (1578); XIII
284, 333 (1581-2); XX 308 (1591); XXV 12 (1595); XXVI 317, 409 (1596-7); XXX
193 (1600); A.P.C. 1614-5, 3 (1615); A.P.C. 1616-7, 79, 152, 222 (1616-7); A.P.C.
1621-3, 18 (1621); A.P.C. 1626, 32. Similarly, order amounting to garnishment of debt
owed to Crown servant's debtor: Dasent XXIV 398 (1593); orders to restore to Crown servants' property of which they had been dispossessed: Dasent I 225, 348 (1545); A.P.C.
1613-4, 158; order to surrender evidence needed to enforce claim against third person:
Dasent XXXI 9 (1600); order for quiet enjoyment of land recovered in legal action by Crown
servant: Dasent XV 249 (1587); order to assist in securing surrender of property required
for administration of decedent's estate: Dasent XX 292 (1591).
3 6 Aid in enforcement of judgments: Dasent VIII 341 (1575); XI 162 (1579); XIII
48 (1571); XIX 478 (1590). In Dasent X 391 (1578), the Chief Justice of the Queen's
Bench was ordered not to release from civil arrest a debtor of a Crown servant.
Mediation with creditors to procure reasonable settlements or to avoid losses to Crown
servants through penalties or forfeitures: Dasent VIII 199, 310 (1574); IX 212 (1576);
X 234, 235 (1578); XIII 107 (1581); XV 426 (1588); XVII 154 (1589); XX 155 (1590);
XXI 51 (1591); XXIV 44, 47, 439 (1593).
Securing release from arrest: Dasent XIII 308 (1582); XIV 36 (1586); XVI 332
(1588); XX 355 (1591); XXII 66 (1591); XXXII 346 (1601); A.P.C. 1613-14, 283
(1613).
Other miscellaneous examples of similar aid to Crown servants: Dasent VIII 307
(1574); X 308 (1578); XIV 115 (1586); XVIII 178 (1589); XIX 480 (1590); XXIII
119 (1592); XXXII 398 (1601); A.P.C. 1615-16, 135 (1615). Cf. Dasent XVII 127
(1589), in which the justices of the Queen's Bench were asked for their ''lawefull favors"
in setting aside an indictment, alleged to be erroneous, against a servant of the English
Ambassador to France.
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present service to the Crown provided a specific motivation, which
was often expressly referred to in the Council's own instructions.
Much more important, both in practice and for their theoretical
implications, were the protections given royal officers against threatened
litigation. The power of the Crown to stay civil actions against royal
officers had been asserted from an early period. 37 The attempts that
had been made to restrict protections had been successfully resisted by
the Crown, and during the Tudor and early Stuart periods their validity
was not seriously challenged. Protections were used for a variety of
purposes, such as facilitating economic enterprises in which the Crown
had a special interest and providing periods of respite for insolvent
private debtors. 38 Protections to royal officers appear frequently in the
Council registers, usually cast in the form of a general warrant to all
royal officers, forbidding arrest of the officer named during a specified
interval (usually six months).39 In some instances protection was given
not merely against arrest, but against prosecution of any form of civil
action. 40 The same principle of immunity from suit while engaged in
Crown service could be deduced from measures taken against creditors
who had sued royal officers in absence of any prior prohibition. Not
only were the creditors themselves instructed in such cases to stay their
proceedings, but letters were sent to the judges before whom the actions
were pending, "requiring" them to stay proceedings until the period of
Crown service had ended.41
87 At least as early as the first part of the thirteenth century: FLOWER, lliTRODUCTION
To THE CURIA REa1s RoLLs (Selden Society) 15, 32, 336-7.
38 Protections given to shipbuilders: Dasent XXV 83 (1595); a skilled iron founder:
Dasent X 195 (1578); mine operators: Dasent VI 226 (1557) and A.P.C., 1621-3, 488; the
operator of alum works: A.P.C. 1623-5, 100. Similarly, a servant of the French Ambassador:
Dasent III 384 (1551), and in numerous cases to protect private litigants during their
attendance before the Council: Dasent X 97, 356 (1578); XII 327 (1581); XIII 360
(1582); XVI 89 (1688); XIX 251, 291 (1590); XXII 389, 520 (1592); XXIV 209 (1593);
XXV 206, 254 (1596); XXVII 196 (1597); XXIX 462 (1599); A.P.C. 1625-6, 25 (1625).
Protections given by way of respite to private debtors are referred to below, note 64.
89 Nicolas VII 305 (1542); Dasent X 290 (1578); XIV 98 (1586); XV 344 (1578);
XVII 452 (1589); XXII 516 (1592); XXV 80, 92, 188 (1595-6); XXVI 118 (1586);
XXVIII 390 (1598); XXIX 181, 409, 695 (1598-9); XXX 783 (1600); XXXII 66 (1601);
A.P.C. 1619-21, 75 (1619); A.P.C. 1621-3, 192, 395 (1622-3); A.P.C. 1623-5, 79. As
late as 1640, the unpublished manuscript of the Privy Council register reveals a similar protection, given for a period of six months. Register of the Privy Council, April-Sept., 1640
(Charles I, vol. 17, part 2, p. 243b).
40 Nicolas VII 159 (1541); Dasent XXIX 695 (1599); A.P.C. 1618-1619, 216 (1618);
A.P.C. 1623-5, 166, 170; A.P.C. 1625-6, 222, 223, 272, 340; A.P.C. 1626, 8, 165, 294.
41 Instructions to private suitors: Dasent III 8 (1550); XII 66, 290 (1580); XV 110
(1587).
Instructions to common law judges: Dasent III 323 (1551); X 32, 153 (1577-8);
XII 66 (1590); XIII 141 (1581); XXI 268 (1591); XXVII 236, 322, 323 (1597); to the
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It would be too much to say that the special privileges and immunities of royal officers had exempted them by the early seventeenth
century from the ordinary law of the land. It seems clear enough that
the Privy Council under Elizabeth and the early Stuarts had recognized,
and was prepared to enforce, a principle of immunity for Crown officers
from civil liability for official acts.42 But a broader principle of internal
responsibility of the administration, such as was to appear in France,
would have required much longer to develop. In France the organization of a royal civil service was only well begun by the early seventeenth
century, and the principle of internal responsibility did not take shape
until a later stage, through the work of the royal Councils. The institutions and the procedure to enforce such a principle had hardly
emerged in England, when the Puritan revolution intervened to destroy
them.

3. Merchants' Cases
Next to royal officers, the class of persons who could count most
. certainly on aid from the Privy Council were the merchants, especially
the foreign merchants. It is easy to understand the Council's interest
in their affairs. The promotion of trade was recognized as a primary
concern of the central government. The foreign merchants in particular formed a kind of international community, of great influence and
power. In their dealings with local officials or the local population they
met with much hostility. For many types of merchants' transactions,
especially those of foreigners, the resources of the common law were
entirely inadequate.
The connection between foreign commerce and foreign politics
was partly revealed by the Council's registers. The foreign diplomatic
missions in England were constantly engaged in promoting the interests of their nationals, in protesting the delays of English procedure,
and in overcoming the bias and inertia of English officials.43 Action
Court of Wards: Dasent XII 289 (1580); to the Chancery: Dasent VIlI 214 (1574); to
local sheriffs: Dasent XII 290 (1590); XV 110 (1587); XVI 344 (1588).
42 Actions for false imprisonment brought against royal officers, because of fuiprison·
ment ordered in the course of their official duties, treated as contempt justifying arrest by
the Council: Dasent XV 308 (1587); stay ordered of actions brought for arrest made in the
Queen's service: Dasent XVIII 367 (1589); stay ordered of action on the case .for words
spoken in the Queen's service: Dasent XIX 149 (1590); Barons of the Exchequer ordered
to dismiss suit brought for search and seizure ordered by the Council: A.P.C. 1621-3, 508.
43Illustrations only can be given: Dasent I 140 (1543); IV 289 (1553); VIlI 34
(1571); XXV 456 (1596); XXVI 452 (1597); XXXI 271 (1601); A.P.C. 1613-14, 234,
577.
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on their demands was required not only for the sake of friendly relations with continental states but to ensure success of similar efforts
being made on behalf of English nationals abroad. 44
During the middle decades of the sixteenth century the Council
was much concerned with the specific problem of piracy. The line
between pirate and trader was still somewhat hard to define. With
rapid shifts in national policy, with wars and threats of war, sea-faring
Englishmen and the population of the ports found it easy to believe
that the spoiling of foreign vessels was a form of national service. It
was not till late in the reign of Elizabeth that the energetic measures
of the Council had largely succeeded in reducing piracy to those forms
approved by the Queen.45
In its relations with foreign merchants in general, it seems quite
clear that the Council would have welcomed some satisfactory means
of relieving itself of the burdens they imposed. Alien in speech and
outlook, involved in novel and complex transactions, the clamoring
foreign merchants must have· been harassing to busy men. In some
few instances, for lack of an appropriate forum, the Council undertook
to hear fully and adjudicate their cases on its own authority.46 Its chief
reliance was of course the Court of Admiralty, to which innumerable
cases were referred. 47 But the delays in the Admiralty, due largely to
its elaborate written procedure, made it necessary to intervene constantly in Admiralty proceedings, to give specific instructions for disposition of Admiralty cases, and to recall to the Council cases already
44 This motivation, which seems obvious enough, was often made explicit in letters
addressed to private persons or officials in England: Dasent VII 365 (1570); XXV 456
(1596); XXVI 452 (1597). The Council Registers are full of instructions to English diplomatic representatives, to bestir themselves on behalf of English merchants abroad, as in
Nicolas VII 314 (1542); Dasent I 176, 275 (1545); IV 50 (1552); VII 349, 392 (1567,
1570); VIII 4, 6 (1571); XXVII 82 (1597).
45 The Council Registers for the middle years of the sixteenth century contain very
large numbers of orders for restitution of goods seized, and for capture and trial of pirates.
Some relief to the Council was secured in 1550 by the appointment of a royal Commission for
Depredations (Dasent III 113), which was given wide powers in apprehending offenders,
trying disputed issues, and ordering restitution of goods seized.
46 Dasent I 38, 259 (1542, 1545); III 300 (1551); VII 226 (1565); XIV 10 (1586);
XXV 194 (1596). In the case last referred to, the Council ordered Windham, an English
merchant who had been discharged of all liability by an Admiralty decree, to pay £1409 to
his creditor, a Scot; the Council then usecf this example of relief "by theire absolute aucthorities, without juditiall proceedinge by lawe as Windham required," as an argument for
similar extraordinary measures by the King of Scotland in favor of English merchants. Dasent
XXV 474 (1596).
47 A few illustrations out of many: Dasent I 187, 266, 416 (1545, 1546); III 370
(1551); IV 34, 47 (1552); VII 170, 235, 329, 365 (1564-1570); IX 71, 148 (1576); XXV
387 (1596); A.P.C. 1621-3, 215 (1622).
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once referred. 48 The process of the Admiralty encountered widespread
resistance, especially when employed in the unpopular task of assisting
foreign merchants. No Tudor court received the aid of the Council
more frequently or more freely than the Court of Admiralty. 49 This
aid must be explained by the indispensable services it rendered, in a
class of cases of special interest to the Crown.
Other types of assistance to foreign merchants were given, in the
greatest variety. They included protections against litigation,50 warnings to lower court judges against partiality or excessive technicality in
their decision of foreign merchants' cases,51 assistance in the collection
of needed evidence,52 and orders to private persons to pay debts owed
to foreigners or else show cause to the contrary before the Council.5 3
Most commonly, the service rendered by the Council was arrangement
of arbitrations. As will be suggested later, the use of arbitration was
characteristic not only of the Council's procedure, but of Tudor and
Stuart equity in general. In cases involving foreign merchants, arbitration could make a special contribution. By this means it was possible
not only to escape the technicalities of common law procedure and the
bias of its officials, but to enlist the judgment and experience of the
merchants themselves on problems with which both common law and
equity were unprepared to deal. The number of arbitrations directed
by the council was large. In foreign merchants' cases the arbitral
commissions were usually composed exclusively of merchants, though
the civil lawyers of the Admiralty and the Court of Requests were
48 Dasent ill 135, 149 (1550); VII 203 (1564); VIII 38 (1571); XIII 20, 103
(1581); XVII 138 (1589); XXV 387 (1596); A.P.C. 1613-14, 80 (1613). One case,
involving an Admiralty prize, shuttled back and forth between Council and Admiralty for
almost a year. Dasent I 187, 265, 294, 382, 411, 415, 486, 493, 517, 520 (1545-6). In
another case, in 1551, the Council reviewed a final judgment in the Admiralty and after full
hearing directed its revision, disclaiming at the same time any intention of creating a precedent for other cases. Dasent III 300 (1551).
49 Supra, note 23.
50 General protections against civil arrest: Dasent XX 365 (1590); XXII 5 (1591);
XXX 365 (1600); information by private person against foreign merchant ordered dismissed
and informer to be brought before Council if he persists: Dasent VII 300 (1565).
51 Dasent I 461 (1546); IV 289 (1553); VII 259 (1565); XXVI 304, 452 (1596);
XXVII 43 (1597). In Dasent XIV 252 (1586), officials of a mayor's court were ordered
under threat of arrest to satisfy personally a judgment debt owed to a Scottish merchant after
they had released the judgment debtor from arrest and discharged his surety.
52 Dasent IV 52 (1552); XX 237 (1591). In Dasent XVII 182 (1589), the sherifF of
Norfolk was directed to prevent an English debtor's disposal of his goods with a view to
defeating the claims of Scottish merchants.
53 Dasent ill 215 (1551); X 14 (1577); XXV 189 (1596); XXXII 315 (1601);
A.P.C. 1613-14, 577 (1614); A.P.C. 1615-16, 21 (1615).
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sometimes included.54 The motives of the Council in such cases were
well summarized in 1595, when it explained its desire to settle the
matter in question "without processe and suite of lawe, the same being
inconvenient for straungers not well acquainted with the lawes of our
nation, for the better expedicion and for the especiall regard we have
to dispatche the causes of straungers."55
The arbitration service organized by the Privy Council was available, in fact, to English merchants as well, though the motives connected with foreign trade were presumably absent here. In many of
these cases the orders of appointment do not suggest that issues of
unusual complexity were involved. The desire apparently was to
secure a summary procedure, a more competent and informed tribunal,
and emancipation from technical rules of the common law.56 On the
other hand, in cases involving the settlement of accounts between
merchants, some complication could be expected; the need for experienced personnel was still greater, and arbitration provided the
means. 57 Similarly, the new practice of merchants' insurance threw
54 Commissions composed exclusively of merchants: Dasent II 377 (1550); IV 7, 27
(1552); VII 62, 332 (1558, 1566); VIII 7 (1571); IX 169 (1576); XI 49 (1579); XXII
61 (1591); XXV 117, 382, 427 (1595-6); XXVI 29, 134, 363, 556 (1596); XXIX 136
(1599); XXX 273, 698 (1600); A.P.C. 1616-17, 5 (1616). In some instances it was clear
that the Council was seeking to give effect to doctrines considerably in advance of the common law doctrines of the period, as in a defense of impossibility of performance in a merchant's contract, in Dasent VIII 367 (1575).
Commissions composed of civil lawyers: VI 218, 221 (1557); IX 91 (1576); XXVII
29 (1597).
References of this type of case were also made to the Master of the Rolls and the
Solicitor General (Dasent IX 307); to the Lord Keeper and the Chancellor of the Exchequer
(Dasent XXVI 350); and to the Bishop of Durham (Dasent XXV 456).
55Dasent XXV 127 (1595) .. The preference of the foreign merchants themselves for
arbitration may be deduced from the treaties with various trading states of the Continent,
specifically requiring arbitration in place of ordinary trial. Such treaty provisions provided
further ground in some cases for the Council's intervention: Dasent XXIII 21 (1592); XXV
105 (1595).
56 Arbitral commissions composed of merchants to deal with disputes between English
merchants: Dasent III 51 (1550); VIII 22 (1571); X 380 (1578); XI 223 (1579); XIII
215 (1581); XIV 154 (1586); XV 156, 197 (1587); XVI 392 (1588); XXIV 109 (1593);
XXX 609 (1600); XXXI 344 (1601); A.P.C. 1621-3, 52 (1621); A.P.C. 1623-5, 217
(1624).
In Dasent XI 213 (1579), the reason given for reference to arbitration was that the
complaining party, a partner, was precluded by rules of the common law from suing the
other partners. In Dasent XVIII 363 (1590), three Masters of Requests were appointed
arbitrators on the ground that the case, "being a marine cause," could not be tried by ordinary
procedure in the Court of Requests or in "any other Court of Record."
57 Commissions of merchants to settle accounts: Dasent X 156 (1578); XIV 24, 268
(1586); XVII 122 (1589); XVIII 26 (1589); XIX 126, 217 (1590); XX 122, 345
(1590-1); XXVII 138 (1597); A.P.C. 1616-17, 43, 189; A.P.C. 1618-19, 161 (1618).
Reference of merchants' accounts to other merchants "who can best skill thereof" was the
practice in the Chancery as well. An illustration appears in MoNRo, Am:A CANCBLLARIAB
484 (1847).
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up problems entirely outside the range of established common law and
equity doctrine. Commissions for arbitration were organized by the
Council, composed of the merchants themselves; at one stage it appeared that some such solution might become permanent.58
By these activities the Council made a significant contribution,
through creating a separate channel for informal adjudication of
merchants' cases. In themselves they contained only a limited promise
for the future. For the development of merchants' courts, of the type
which was later to produce on the continent a separate law for merchants and commercial transactions, it was necessary that there be a
more permanent assignment of functions and a permanent personnel.
It was already certain, from experience with the Court of Admiralty,
that the growth of a new tribunal would have encountered unrelenting
opposition from the common lawyers. On the other hand, the whole
issue as to reception of commercial custom was unresolved at the end
of the Tudor period. From the practice of arbitration, promoted and
organized by the Privy Council, it might have been possible to develop
a system of merchants' courts, with permanent results on the structure
of English law.59 In the end the environment proved hostile and the
need not great enough.
4.

Aid to Debtors

The largest class of litigation dealt with by the Tudor and Stuart
Privy Councils was concerned with aid to debtors. The motives for
this activity were mixed, but the need to which the Council responded
158 Ad hoc commissions for arbitration of insurance cases were the first solution attempted,
but with unsatisfactory results. Dasent VIII 195, 262, 348, 374 (1574-5); IX 43, 90, 163,
230 (1575-6). When the Council was confronted with an insurance case "so strainge as
requireth thadvice and consultacion of such as to be experienced in those kinde of dealinges,"
an augmented commission of ten persons was appointed [Dasent IX 168 (1573)]; this was
transformed into a permanent commission which continued to function for some years and
received the Council's strong support in its activities. Dasent X 232 (1578); IX 360 (1579);
XI 393 (1580); XII 25 (1580); XV 264 (1587). By 1601 this Commission had apparently
been allowed to lapse and the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench was ordered to join with
the Admiralty Judge to set down orders for dealing with insurance cases. Dasent XXXI 252
(1601). A statutory solution was attempted through the special court (including merchants)
set up by 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601), whose usefulness the common lawyers helped to destroy.
1 HoLDswoRTH, HisTORY oP ENGLISH I.Aw 571 (1922).
59 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY oP ENGLISH I.Aw 149-153 (1924). It should be pointed
out, however, that while the growth of the merchants' courts in France owed much to the
local organizations of merchants, the main impetus came from the central government. The
conclusions of Holdsworth, (id. at 68-71) as to the local origins of the merchants' courts,
are based on Italian experience.
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can be traced to a single source-the extraordinary severity and limited
range of the common law of contract.
As reB.ected in the work of the Privy Council, the main problems
did not arise from defects in common law doctrine. In fact, by the
end of the sixteenth century rapid progress was being made by common law courts in developing new remedies for breach of informal contract. It had become quite possible to frame commercial transactions
with a minimum of formality and with moderate sanctions in the event
of breach, through simple damages. But usage had not been adjusted
to these newer possibilities. The standard form of contract remained
the penal bond, with its drastic provisions for forfeiture on default.
Though much tempered in application by the remedies of equity, such
penalty provisions were commonly reinforced by elaborate arrangements for further security, through mortgage and suretyship. The intricate system of creditors' security marked the growing pains of a
credit economy, which had not yet learned to distribute creditors' risks.
The problem confronting the Council was one part of the larger problem confronting Tudor equity, the survival in usage of archaic forms
of contract, whose sanctions seemed intolerably severe to contemporary
opinion.
The Elizabethan and early Stuart Councils spent a good part of
their energy in extricating debtors from the wheels of this machine.
In one aspect the aid given debtors can be viewed as another form of
service to mercantile classes, since it was the merchants and traders
who were most likely to find themselves overextended and to be caught
in the chain of successive forfeitures. But it is scarcely necessary to
search in detail for economic motivations. Whatever the debtor's status,
the system itself produced ruin out of all proportion to the default.
The chain of forfeitures, once begun, brought bonds and counterbonds
into suit, brought sale of assets at knock-down prices, brought arrest of
the debtor and disaster to his sureties. Any body of responsible men
who conceived their duties to society in the widest sense and who
had the power to act must have wished to avert results so contradictory
to good sense and so harmful to the interests of the creditors themselves.
The chief means for rehabilitating debtors was simply through
extension of time. The method used was characteristic, a system of
arbitration which enlisted the aid of inB.uential laymen. Where merchants were the debtors, the arbitrators were usually merchants, either
men of standing in local communities or officers in the commercial
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towns whose election by other merchants gave them added personal
authority. 60 Where persons not merchants were involved, the appointments were directed to prominent royal officials, to members of the
nobility, or most commonly to local country gentry. 61 The appointments usually recited the causes of the debtor's distress and ordered
mediation with creditors to secure time for the debtor's recovery and
suspension of suits in the interval.
Though arbitration was the preferred method, the Council stood
ready to supply further sanctions. An effective moratorium, achieved
through consent, quite obviously required substantial unanimity
among the creditors. In a large percentage of cases the principal creditors were willing to exercise restraint, if only through self-interest.
For the creditor armed with his bond who refused to make any concession, the Council included in its directions to arbitrators, as a matter
of routine, a request to report any difficulties and the names of those
creditors who refused to concur in the extensions of time recommended.
That these instructions were seriously intended is shown by the occasional cases in which the Council called recalcitrant creditors before
it to subject them to further persuasion, with at least a vague threat
of arrest. 62
More basic questions of legal power were raised by instructions
to judicial officers to stay proceedings against debtors during the period
required for their rehabilitation. From the language used it was often
difficult to distinguish the stay by consent from the stay made mandatory by the Council's order. This was particularly true where arbitra60 Dasent IX 137, 224 (1576); XII 40, 238 (1580); XIII 253, 420 (1581-2); XIV 21,
205, 222, 238 (1586); xv 16, 78, 113, 250, 270, 345, 346, 367, 386, 402, 403 (1587-8);
XVI 96, 165, 259 (1588); XVII 8, 44, 56, 172, 258, 276 (1588-9); XIX 152, 153, 191,
262, 354 (1590); XX 46, 66, 98, 264, 345, 348 (1590-1); XXII 168, 197, 310 (1591-2);
XXIII 120, 248 (1592); XXV 90, 198, 292 (1595); XXVI 19, 71 (1596); XXVII 23,
169, 230, 231 (1597); XXVIII 19, 394, 550 (1597-8); XXIX 211 (1598); XXXI 113
(1601); A.P.C. 1615-16, 72 (1615); A.P.C. 1616-17, 5, 120, 283; A.P.C. 1618-19, 109,
184 (1618); A.P.C. 1619-21, 32 (1619); A.P.C. 1621-3, 176 (1622).
61 Dasent X 403 (1578); XI 415 (1589); XII 308 (1581); XIV 285, 348, 368 (1587);
XV 30, 82, 242 (1587); XVI 103, 311 (1588); XVII 24, 63, 152, 199, 223, 290, 332
(1589); XIX 160, 302, 351 (1590); XX 17, 45, 91, 130, 147, 185, 238, 299 (1590-1);
XXIII 328 (1592); XXV 355, 376 (1596); XXVII 337 (1597); XXIX 552 (1599);
XXXI 108 (1601); XXXII 401, 429 (1601); A.P.C. 1613-14, 31, 378, 472; A.P.C. 161516, 704; A.P.C. 1619-21, 126; A.P.C. 1621-23, 313.
62 Dasent XIV 311, 313 (1587); XV 24 (1587); XXXIII 509 (1604); A.P.C. 1623-5,
355 (1624). In Dasent XX 90 (1590), the Council addressed letters to the creditor advising
him to follow "a milder course," since othenvise their Lordships "shuld be constrained to take
that course against him as otherwise they would be lothe to doe." The delicacy of this
approach is to be contrasted, however, with the authority to imprison which had just been
given to the Commission for poor prisoners. Infra, note 75.
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tion was authorized by local judicial officers in the commercial towns,
who might be expected to order a stay pending their own efforts at
mediation. But in numerous instances, the intent to protect the debtor
by a mandatory stay is made quite explicit, in orders that provide in
other respects for standard arbitration. 63 Still clearer were the letters
cast in the form of royal protection, directed to all royal officers and
also at times to the creditors, forbidding the prosecution of any suits
during a specified period (six months to a year) against the individual
named. Fairly common in the reign of Elizabeth, respites by way of
general protection had become a normal remedy under James I. 64 Being
granted on application of the debtor, with no organized system of
judicial control or investigation, they were peculiarly subject to abuse. 65
As they became divorced from the system of arbitration on which the
Elizabethan Council primarily relied, protections for debtors emerged
clearly as an invasion of private right, on the outer verge of legality.
Attempts to enforce them raised questions as to the powers of the Council, and ultimately of the Crown. These questions will be considered
later.
Even after a moratorium was achieved, there remained the problem of the debtor whose assets, when all assembled, could not meet
his outstanding obligations. Here the remedy must be composition.
For this purpose the remedies provided by the common law were quite
obviously unsuitable. Even the statutory innovations of the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries, which laid the bare foundations for
a modem system of bankruptcy, were aimed at the dishonest debtor
63 Officers of the City of London directed to forbear arrest of the debtor pending their
mediation: Dasent, XI 423 (1578); XIII 13, 112, 220 (1581); XIV 43, 139, 251, 328
(1586); XVI 122 (1589); XX 30, 43, 255 (1590-1); XXI 386 (1591); XXII 147, 540
(1592); XXVI 391 (1596). Similarly, Dasent XV 147 (1587); XIX 18 (1590); XXII
424 (1592).
0-1 Dasent IX 5, 78: 154 (1576); X 315 (1578); XI 89, 171 (1579); XII 63, 134
(1580); XIII 277 (1581); XX 328, 329 (1591); XXI 295, 369 (1591); XXII 252, 574
(1592); XXVI 362 (1596); XXX 365 (1600); XXXI 25 (1600); A.P.C. 1615-16, 462
(1616); A.P.C. 1618-19, 284; A.P.C. 1621-3, 27, 114, 117, 206, 234, 246, 288, 299, 351,
373, 386, 407, 417, 431, 447; A.P.C. 1623-5, 25, 36, 58, 65, 67, 77, 93, 130, 168, 200,
240, 242, 297, 337, 405, 433, 488, 501; A.P.C. 1625-6, 21, 48, 65, 69, 99, 120, 204, 207,
218, 239, 253, 265, 310; A.P.C. 1626, 25, 122, 305, 320, 339, 379, 387, 432. Through
the device of a royal protection, without time limit, the Council established the principle of
limited liability for a group of merchant adventurers to Russia, in the proceedings described
in A.P.C. 1621-3, 59, 71, 326, 345 (1622).
lla Numerous entries indicate the obstruction to creditors through protections given on
false information: Dasent XIII 348 (1582); XV 97 (1587); XVI 131 (1588); XXID 31,
· 65 (1592); XXV 202 (1596); A.P.C. 1623-5, 166 (1624). Probably the worst offender
was Gerard Malynes, the well-known author on commercial law: A.P.C. 1618-19, 163, 267
(1618).
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and gave additional sanctions against the debtor's evasion. Though the
principle of ratable distribution was included, there was no measure
of relief for the honest debtor, who sought means to restore his position
by a scaling down of debts. 66 But for the Council, with its wide powers
and its practical view of the problem, it was a short step from the
device of a respite to an outright composition. The principal means,
again, was the arbitral commission. The arbitrators chosen, usually
merchants in merchants' cases, were simply directed to deal with the
creditors to secure not only an extension of time but a scaling down
of debts. 67 As in the simple respite, stay of all actions by creditors was
sometimes directly ordered. 68 For the creditor who refused to conform
to the settlement recommended, there was at least the vague menace
of the Council's displeasure, reinforced by an order to appear before
the Council to give reasons for his obduracy. 69 Much more than this
was apparently not needed. Through the prestige of the Council and
the aid it could enlist, a most useful and necessary service was enabled
to continue right up to the civil war. 70
The rehabilitation of debtors that has been so far described was
in a sense preventive; that is, it was aimed at suspending ·creditors'
remedies before they had reached their inevi~ble end in the debtor's
total destruction. At the other extreme were those innumerable cases
where the machine had ground through to a stop, with the debtor
lodged in jail, his assets seized and all avenues of escape cut off. The
motives that inspired other forms of aid to debtors were just as relevant
66 8 HoLDswoRTH, HrsTORY oF ENGLISH I.Aw 236-245 (1926).
67Dasent X 243 (1578); XII 116,299, 342 (1580-1); XIII 88, 345, 363 (1582); XV
32, 149, 177 (1587); XVI 264 (1588); XVII 193 (1589); XXX 75 (1600); A.P.C. 161314, 169, 204, 522; A.P.C. 1615-16, 55; A.P.C. 1618-19, 124; A.P.C. 1621-23, 118, 277,
381, 451; A.P.C. 1623-5, 32, 309; A.P.C. 1625-6, 46; A.P.C. 1626, 25, 101. In two cases
the orders for composition were drawn up in detail by a member of the Council and the
Council itself undertook to enforce them directly: Dasent XV 27 (1587); XIX 153 (1590).
68 Dasent XIII 277 (1581); XIV 268 (1586); XX.VI 391 (1596).
69 A.P:C. 1613-14, 102 (1613): ''Wee do take your neglect in ill part and ...• wee do
commaund yow, all excuses and delayes sett apart, to make your speedie repaire before us
of his Majestie's Councell, to give us heerein that satisfaction which wee did formerly require
at your handes. And heereof yow are not to fayle, as yow will answere the contrary."
70 8 HoLDsWORTH, HrsTORY oF ENGLISH I.Aw 234 (1926), refers to cases before the
Council in 1637. There is evidence that in the interval an attempt had been made to transfer
this class of cases to the Chancery [A.P.C. 1616-17, 190; RrrCHIE, CASES DECIDED BY LoRD
BACON 161 (1932)], but by general order of the Chancellor in 1620, confirmed by royal
proclamation in 1621, the filing of such "bills of conformity" was forbidden unless subscribed
by all the creditors. SANDERS, ORDERS IN CHANCERY 129, 132; 8. HOLDSWORTH, HrsTORY
OF ENGLISH LA.w 244 (1926). The cases cited above, note 67, indicate that these regulations
did not apply to the Council. The activities of the Council and Chancery in this period are
discussed further by Treiman, "Majority Control in Compositions: Its Historical Origins and
Development," 24 VA. L. REv. 507 (1938).
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here. The ruin of the debtor was now complete and, as before, quite
out of proportion to the fault. The condition of the debtor was often
so desperate as to inspire pity. Furthermore, in some districts the
debtors' jails were so crowded as to create a serious risk of pestilence.71
The common law system of civil arrest had in fact created a national
problem, which political agencies could not ignore.
Energetic measures to secure the release of arrested debtors appear
in the reign of Elizabeth. As in the respites and compositions previously
discussed, principal reliance was placed on the method of arbitration. 72
The letters appointing arbitrators usually include appeals to human
compassion not common in other cases. This is indeed not surprising.
Some feelings of compassion were naturally aroused by the misery and
despair of the prisoners. Furthermore,. the Council had need of some
new principle, for its work was now pressed beyond the outer limits
of strict legality. It was seeking to deprive the creditors of the fruits
of their legal remedies, already realized.
It is therefore of some interest that the Elizabethan Council undertook to organize the work of mediation by commissions of a more permanent character, and to invest them with wider powers. The first
of these commissions was appointed in 1576, headed by the two Chief
Justices, and empowered to deal with the creditors of all persons imprisoned by the Queen's Bench. They were directed to sit regularly
and to issue such orders as they thought appropriate after hearing the
interested parties. This commission remained active for at least thirteen
years. 73 The great throng of prisoners in local jails in other parts of
the country then led to the appointment of commissions for most of
the major jails.74 In 1589, the original commission for Queen's Bench
prisoners was reorganized and strengthened and was itself authorized
71 Dasent XV 157 (1587).
7 2 Dasent X 209 (1578); XIII

305, 331 (1582); XIV 64 (1586); XV 329, 385, 392
(1588); XVII 26, 97, 137, 296, 298, 304, 341, 351 (1589); XIX 52, 62, 221, 351 (1590);
XX 168, 199, 244 (1591); XXI 322 (1591); XXII 233 (1592); XXVI ll8 (1596);
XXVIII 533 (1598); XXX 393 (1600); A.P.C. 1618-19, 486 (1619); A.P.C. 1619-21,
222 (1620).
73 The order of appointment is referred to in Dasent IX 110 (1576), which indicates
a membership, among others, of the two Chief Justices, the Bishop of London, the Deans of
Westminster and St. Paul's, and the Master of the Rolls. Subsequent entries reveal numerous
orders referring cases to the Commission: Dasent X 93, 135, 236, 317, 318 (1577-8); XI
195 (1579); XII 299, 302 (1581); XIII 175, 183, 214, 354, 357, 387 (1581-2); XIV 118,
266, 269, 295 (1586); XV 14, 257 (1587); XVIII 66 (1589).
74 Norwich jail: Dasent XIV 246 (1586); XV 157 (1587); XVI 401 (1588); XVII
330 (1589); XXX 230, 371 (1600); Ipswich jail: XXVI-ll8 (1596); Ludgate prison:
XIV 24 (1586); City of London: XVIII 389 (1590); Milton jail in Suffolk: XV 311 (1587).
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to imprison for disobedience of its orders. 75 For the remaining years
of Elizabeth this general commission rendered a variety of useful services, though it became embroiled with private litigants and required
the Council's constant support. 76
The Commissions for Poor Prisoners were apparently abandoned
after the accession of James I. In the absence of direct evidence one
can only surmise that the motive was the doubtful legality of the
commissions' powers, creating great difficulty in protecting it against
attacks in the common law courts. The clearing out of the debtors'
jails thus disappears as a major objective of royal policy under the first
two Stuarts. But relief to debtors through respites and compositions
remained a major activity, not only of the Privy Council but of the King
himself, through more _personal forms of intervention that will later
be described. Altogether it can be said that aid to distressed debtors
was the most useful service rendered by the Privy Council to English
private law and that the abolition of its private jurisdiction in 1641
brought at this point the greatest harm. 77

5. Aid to the Poor

If one can trust official recitals of motive, another prin~ipal aim of
the Council was aid to the poor against the costs and delays of litigation
and the influence of powerful adversaries. ;Like aid to royal servants
and to merchants, this motive could operate in an enormous variety
of cases, without limitation of subject matter.
There appears in fact no reason for distrusting official recitals of
motive. Aid to the poor implied no intention to subvert the existing
75 The instructions to the reorganized commission appear in Dasent XVIII 109 (1589).
It still includes the two Chief Justices as members and is directed to sit two days in every
week. The power to commit appears from the recital in Dasent XX 9 (1590), which
indicates that any six members of the Commission were authorized to imprison provided
always that the Archbishop of Canterbury was one of the six.
76 The Council was able to unload on the Commission a considerable volume of litigation: Dasent XIX 98, 201, 396, 471 (1590); XX 48, 49, 220, 264 (1590-1); XXIII 102
(1592); XXIV 143 (1593); XXVI 212 (1596); XXVII 83, 117, 143 (1597); XXVIII
118 (1596); XXIX 312 (1598); XXX 472, 638, 644, 767 (1600); XXXI 384 (1601). In
its attempts to secure the release of prisoners it was clear that the Commission and its predecessors were forced to administer some miscellaneous equity: Dasent XIII 214 (1581), relief
against enforcement of penal bond; XVII 157 (1589) and XXI 109 (1591), enforcement
of principal's obligation to indemnify surety; XXII 319 (1592), relief against usury; XIII
363 (1582) and XIV 153 (1586), negotiation of composition agreements.
The measures adopted by the Council to maintain the position of the Commission against
attack will be discussed in a second installment.
77 Cf. 8 HOLDSWORTH, HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 245 (1926), drawing a similar
conclusion.
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social order, though it might involve some restraint on the heady and
powerful subject. The body of opinion that the Council sought to
enforce was essentially conservative, especially insofar as it still attached
real meaning to the dictates of Christian charity. For poor persons it
was quite true that litigation was long and costly, not only in the common law courts but in the equity courts as well. The Court of Requests,
which still retained the title of a "poor men's court" had bogged down
in its own procedure. Summary aid to the poor remained as a responsibility of the central government and a principal motive for action by
the Council. At times the action took the form of direct orders to
private persons, instructing them to perform their obligations owed to
the poor under threat of further proceedings by the Council.78 More
common were the orders for arbitration by local officials or country
gentry; in many of these instances it was clear, and at times it was
expressly admitted, that the procedures of ordinary courts would have
been adequate if the complainant had not been handicapped by
poverty. 79 In others the equities asserted were either doubtful or of so
shadowy a character that lower courts might have had difficulty in
making them prevail. 80
78 Orders to pay simple money debts: Dasent VI 12 (1556); XIV 28 (1586); XIV
377 (1587); XXI 248 (1591); XXXI 404 (1601); A.P.C. 1613-14, 658 (1614); A.P.C.
1615-16, 92, 181 (1615); A.P.C. 1616-17, 231 (1617); order to principal directing indemnity to surety: Dasent XXV 175, 183 (1596); order to show cause for forfeiting lease of poor
lessee: Dasent XXIV 370 (1593); orders to restore possession to tenants of land: Dasent
XXV 19 (1595); XXVI 76 (1596).
79 Orders for arbitration expressly admitting the availability of remedies in ordinary
courts: Dasent XXVII 228 (1597); XXVIII 347 (1598); XXX 218 (1600); A.P.C. 161819, 254 (1618); A.P.C. 1623-5, 262 (1624).
References to arbitrators of claims for money debts: Dasent XIV 324 (1587); A.P.C.
1613-14, 400, 424 (1614); disputes over title to land: Dasent VII 299 (1565); IX 290
(1577); XX 105, 123, 132 (1590); XXIII 222 (1592); A.P.C. 1615-16, 264 (1615);
A.P.C. 1626, 23, 98; claim of breach by defendant of contract for the exchange of goods:
Dasent XXIV 435 (1593); claim for wrongful entry on land: Dasent XII 279 (1580);
wrongful detention of chattels: A.P.C. 1613-14, 654 (1614); forgery of will: A.P.C. 161314, 479 (1614).
Enforcement of contracts to lease land: Dasent XX 262 (1591); A.P.C. 1613-14, 49
(1613); redemption of mortgage: A.P.C. 1615-16, 58 (1615); purchase money resulting
trust: Dasent XIX 74 (1590); sale of goods by London merchant to poor man at exorbitant
price: Dasent X 187 (1578).
Other miscellaneous cases, in many of which the claims asserted were not s;pecified:
Dasent IX 60 (1575); XII 4, 263 (1580); XVI 92, 285 (1588); XVII 236 (1589); XIX
477 (1590); XX 259 (1591); XXI 83 (1591); XXIII 27 (1592); XXIV 150 (1593);
XXV 245 (1595); XX.VIII 534 (1598); A.P.C. 1615-16, 264 (1615); A.P.C. 1619-21, 68
(1619).
so As in the appeal to a nobleman for "charitable consideracion" to a tenant claiming a
lease of land against which the nobleman had sued out common law execution under a
judgment against the lessor: Dasent XXII 190, 249 (1592). Similarly in the case of a
Portuguese woman who had moved to England with her small daughter, after the death of
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The social conscience that inspired these measures was most
severely tested by the effects of the enclosure movement on the farming population. The political, economic and human issues created by
enclosures were far too complex to produce one single pattern of
respc;mse from the central administration. At one stage, during the
reign of Edward VI, capture of the machinery of government by the
large landlords suspended all measures for relief of dispossessed tenants
and for enforcement of the statutes against enclosures. At all stages,
efforts of the central government were handicapped by its need to
rely in local administration on those very persons, the gentry, who
stood to profit most through the forward march of capitalism. Nevertheless, as Tawney has shown, during most of the Tudor and early
Stuart periods the policy of the central government was conservative.
It tried to preserve the older methods of land use and the traditional
forms of land tenure. For excellent reasons-not only economic and
fiscal but in a larger sense moral-it sought to oppose by legislation
and by intermittent executive action the economic tendencies that in
retrospect seem irresistible.81 Insofar as the Privy Council encountered
these problems in the shape of private litigation, it clearly had no basic
solution to offer for distress and social dislocation on so great a scale.
Its action was framed in terms that applied equally to other types of
litigation. It aimed to prevent unlawful evictions, to prohibit violent
measures until trial could be had in the ordinary courts, to urge more
humane treatment of evicted tenants and to ensure fair trial between
unequal antagonists.82 On the whole, it seems probable that this type
of intervention had some effect in alleviating the condition of the
her English husband, in reliance on the promise of her father-in-law to provide for her in his
will. The arbitrators were urged to arrange some provision by the father-in-law's executor
for her support, since she was "voyd of any helpe in this country." Dasent XXIX 679 (1599).
81 The motives of Tudor policy and the measures adopted to enforce it are described at
length by TAWNEY, THI! AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SDITl!ENTH CBNTORY 313-400_ (1912).
82 Orders forbidding enclosures or summary dispossession of tenants until the rights of
the parties could be established: Dasent IX 296 (1576); XI 191 (1579); XXI 116 (1591);
XXVII 129, 228 (1597). The Council did not stop with expressions of disapproval for the
"foule abuses" of summary dispossession, but in Dasent XVI 366 (1588) ordered prosecution
in the Star Chamber of the dispossessing landlord.
The claims of "pittie and charitie" were urged on landlords in their treatment of dispossessed tenants in Dasent XI 310, 384 (1579-80); XII 7, 45 (1580); XIII 22, 26, 91
(1581); XIV 391 (1587); XVI 117 (1588); XXI 117 (1591).
Arrangements for trial before the local justices or for arbitration by local residents were
more common: Dasent VIII 243 (1574); IX 118, 167, 284, 285, 323 (1576-7); XI 178
(1579); XIV 201 (1586); XV 394 (1588); XXIX 409 (1598); A.P.C. 1616-17, 95; A.P.C.
1621-3, 103,491.
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peasantry and in postponing the ultimate transformation of English
agriculture. 83
The English Privy Council deserves credit for its activities on
behalf of poor litigants. In contrast, the French Grand Conseil and
the judicial agency that largely superseded it, the Conseil Prive, seem
never to have included aid to the poor among the objectives of prerogative justice. On the contrary, the nearest approach to a prerogative
Court of Requests in France-the court held by the Maitres des Requetes de l'Hotel du Roy-was steadily transformed into an instrument
of privilege, whose competence largely depended on grants to favored
individuals giving immunity from suit in the ordinary courts.84 The
efforts of the English Privy Council to secure equal justice for the
poor are some indication that medieval conceptions of the Crown as
a dispenser of justice had continued vitality and some practical uses
in Tudor and Stuart England.

6.

Miscellaneous Equity

The remaining types of private litigation dealt with or considered
by the Council covered so wide a range that classification is difficult.
The most that can be done is to suggest the motives for action where
action was taken. This requires some attention to the very large numbers of cases in which action took no more positive form than the arrangement of arbitration. Referrals to arbitration might imply com83 TAWNEY, THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 355-59, 385-96
(1912).
Additional evidence on the attitudes of the central government is to be found in the
register of petitions to the King covering the period 1603-1616 and preserved in BRIT. Mus.
LANsD., ms. 266. A very large number of the petitions there recorded were brought collectively by tenants in local communities, to complain of enclosures, interference with commons
and demands for increased rents and fines. There were also many instances of suits by individual copyholders for relief against threatened evictions or increases in rent. The solution
adopted in most of these cases, as in other types of petitions, was reference to arbitral commissions, usually of local gentry, though in some exceptional cases the landlord was ordered
summarily to satisfy the petitioners or show cause to the contrary to the King (LANsn., ms.
266, fol. l0a, 12a, 13a, 16a, 115a, 152a, 236b). The remedy through arbitration by local
gentry must often have been delusive; perhaps this is the reason why the number of such
cases diminished steadily in the later years covered by the register. There must have been
some faith in the impartiality of royal justice, however, to inspire the pilgrimage in 1608 of
800 tenants who left their homes to present to the King a petition against their landlord,
Waterhouse. The King, after directing most of them to return to their homes, instructed the
Lord Treasurer to call the spokesmen for the tenants and Waterhouse, and "somarily without
processe of lawe" to take order that the tenants "maye enjoye their livings accordinge to
equitie without oppression." BRIT. Mus. LANsn., ms. 266, fol. 115b (1608).
84 Chenon, Histoire Generale du Droit Francais Public et Prive, vol. II, 540-1, 554-5
(1929)
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plete neutrality on the issues involved in particular disputes. A question
therefore arises as to the purposes for this minimal form of intervention, displacing in so many cases the procedures of lower courts.
The Council clearly was, among other things, a court of equity.
It issued orders for specific performance of contracts for the sale of
interests in land,85 orders for reconveyance by paid-off mortgagees,86
orders for providing relief against forfeitures and for redemption of
mortgaged land,8-Z: orders against principals directing indemnity to sureties,88 and in one case ordered rescission of an improvident sale by a
needy expectant heir for an inadequate price.89 In the field of express
trust there were several orders directed to trustees to compel their compliance with trust obligations, and in one case measures were taken
against a purchaser with notice to prevent defeat of a trust obligation.90
To these cases of direct intervention in the field of trust there should
be added the fairly numerous instances of examination or arbitration
ordered in disputes over alleged breaches of trust, in some of which
the Council clearly expressed its own support for a policy of enforcement.01
85 Dasent II 289 (1549); X 110, 111 (1577); XV 279 (1587); XIX 148 (1590);
XXII 259 (1592).
86 Dasent VIII 333, 359 (1575); IX 78 (1576); XX 296 (1591).
87 Dasent XVIII 262 (1589), r~try on leased land for a minor default; XVIII 184
(1589), mortgagee ordered "in regard ••• of his own credytt and conscience" not to take
advantage of a default in payment by a mortgagor; XXII 380, 1-58 (1592), default in payment
on a mortgage debt which had been multiplied ten times by compound interest, "a matter
in our opinions not fit to be tolerated in a wel governed commonwealth"; XIV 18, 73, 86
(1586); XVII 163 (1589); XXII 459, 494 (1592).
88 Dasent XVII 354 (1589); XVill 282 (1589); XXV 175, 183 (1596); A.P.C.
1623-5, 35 (1623); XIV 356 (1587), the surety in the last cited case having been in debt to
the Queen, so that this factor may have provided an additional motive. In A.P.C. 1615-16,
270 (1615), indemnity to the surety was directed through arbitrators appointed by the
Council.
89 Dasent XXII 414 (1592), the purchaser being ordered to restore the land purchased
through his "lewde perswasions" and through the heir's "wante of experience," on receiving
repayment of the purchase price.
Compare A.P.C. 1613-14, 185 (1613), where a judgment creditor was reported to be
selling his debtor's land at an inadequate price. The Council wrote the judgment creditor
to inform him that if this was true "wee shall hould yow very unwourthy of our good
opinions," and to warn him that he should observe "the generall rule of charity, to do unto
others as yow would be done unto yourselfe."
90 Orders directed to the trustees: Dasent XIV 63 (1586), leasehold; XV 124 (1587),
leasehold; XXI 170 (1591), copyhold; XXVI 21, 49, 137 (1596), chattels; A.P.C. 1621-3,
34 (1621), land.
In Dasent XXII 319 (1591), a purchaser with notice of land subject to a trust was
directed to make no further payments of the purchase price and to appear in person before
the Council for further hearings, the apparent attempt to defeat the trust being described
as a matter of "verie evill example."
91 Dasent VIII 359 (1574); Xill 367 (1582); XVI 306 (1588); XVII 301 (1589);
XIX 33, 173 (1590); XIX 190 (1590), the Council declaring here that if .the charge of
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The enforcement of moral obligations between persons in close
family relationships provided a strong motive for action. In part the
intervention of the Council could be explained by the conviction that
disputes between close relatives were "unnatural" and should be summarily terminated. 92 But in many instances the Council went beyond
this point, particularly where a claim for support was asserted. Though
the parent's duty to support had been recognized only to a very limited
extent by statut~, and outside the statutory limits, was later to be repudiated by English decisions, the sixteenth century Council did not
hesitate to order payments by parents for their children's support. 93 A
more obvious injustice was that created by common law rules as to
married women's property, which gave complete o_wnership or control
of the wife's estate to the husband. To remedy this injustice the Chancery had invented a claim of the wife to fair treatment that came to be
known as the wife's "equity to a settlement."94 In the work of the
Privy Council the wife's right to compensation for property brought to
the marriage was strongly asserted. In practice it was usually translated
into orders directed to the husband providing for payments for support of the wife commensurate with her contributions to his estate.9 ~
breach of trust was true "such unconscionable proceedings would be redressed by some good
and orderly course"; XX 157 (1587); XXV 75 (1595); XXVI 488 (1597).
92 The

usual recourse was to arbitration. Dispute between parents and children referred

to arbitrators: Dasent VIII 515 (1573); XI 250 (1579); XII 351 (1581); XIV 38 (1586);

XV 98 (1587); XXI 71, 153 (1591); XXV 22, 347 (1595-6); XXVII 16, 216 (1597);
XXIX 10, 42 (1598); A.P.C. 1615-16, 368 (1616); A.P.C. 1618-19, 95 (1618); A.P.C.
1623-5, 343 (1624); A.P.C. 1626, 214. The same distaste for "unnaturall contentions"
appeared in disputes between brothers [Dasent XIII 101 (1581); XXI 254 (1591); XXV
405 (1596)]; husband and wife [Dasent XI 79 (1579)]; and nephew and uncle [Dasent IX
238 (1576)].
93 Order to father to pay money for support of son: Dasent XXX 478, 781 (1600);
A.P.C. 1618-19, 304 (1618); A.P.C. 1623-5, 480 (1625); order to father-in-law to provide
support for his daughter-in-law, left a widow with seven children: A.P.C. 1619-21, 33
(1619); order to father to receive his daughter into his home: XXXI 179 (1601).
In Dasent XXIV 171 (1593), a son was directed to make an allowance for the support
of his mother. In Dasent XV 117 (1587), the arrest was ordered of a son-in-law to whom
the plaintiff had transferred his house and goods in return for a promise of support, when it
was charged that the support was denied, that the family was beaten and driven out of the
house, and that the son-in-law travelled about with rowdy companions by night.
94 MoNRO, Ac:rA CANCELLARIAE 655 (1847) reproduces the case of Flecton v. Dennys
(1594), [discussed by 5 HoLDswoRTH, HisTORY OP ENGLISH LAw 313-14 (1924)], in
which the Chancery enforced a wife's claim to a "portion" commensurate with her status and
her contributions to the marriage. In the m(!Iluscript records of the ·Chancery there are
several other cases of the same period supporting the same kind of claim. B:sc1sTER Boox,
1596A, fol. 365b, 610b, 698b, 707a.
95 Nicolas VII 258, 321, 333 (1542); Dasent I 148 (1543); VII 391 (1570); XIV
57 (1586); XXVII 326 (1597); A.P.C. 1613-14, 460 (1614); A.P.C. 1618-19, 232 (1618);
A.P.C. 1621-3, 383 (1624); A.P.C. 1623-5, 49, 380, 383. The case of Lady Windsor v~
Puttenham, involving a similar order for support of the wife by the husband, shuttled back.
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But the Council was not merely a court of equity, if one may use
as a test its willingness to take positive action in cases for which ordinary legal remedies seemed entirely adequate. The numerous orders
to private persons to surrender land or goods detained may possibly
be explained through the Council's broad concern with maintenance
of interna1 order and prevention of private violence.96 Perhaps this
will explain why the Council in 1542 reviewed at some length the
evidence as to title to a horse and entered an interim order for its possession pending final decision by the Council as to its ownership.97 But
similar explanations will not fit the numerous orders to private persons
to pay simple money debts owed not to Crown servants, merchants,
distressed debtors, or other favored persons.98 It is also difficult to exand forth between the Council and Star Chamber for three years, and included orders for
arrest of the husband and for garnishment of his debtor: Dasent IX, 96, 107, 144, 148
(1576); X 260, 355, 356, 363, 430 (1578). In A.P.C. 1621-3, 171, 183 (1622), a license
to the husband to travel abroad was revoked until he made adequate provision for his wife.
In Dasent XIII 434 (1582), the Earl of Derby was ordered to sell a portion of his land to
pay his wife's debts. In A.P.C. 1615-16, 555 (1616), a commission was appointed to arrange
payments for the wife and the children of the marriage out of the assets of an absconding
husband. In Dasent XII 205 (1580), the order for the husband's appearance before the
Council rested not on a claim of denial of support but ''hard usage."
In several cases the claim of the wife for a fair provision from the husband was enforced
through arbitral commissions: Dasent IX 113 (1576); X 209 (1578); XX 59 (1590); XXIV
35 (1592); XXVIII 15 (1597); A.P.C. 1616-17, 39 (1616); A.P.C. 1618-19, 220 (1618).
In the case last cited an award in favor of the wife, by a committee which included Sir
Edward Coke, was confumed by the Council and ordered executed. It should be added that
some of these orders duplicated the similar work of the High Commission in ordering payments by the husband for the support of the wife.
96 Dasent II 447 (1547); III 244, 429 (1551); VIII 287 (1574), XXV 79, 188 (1596).
Similarly, sequestration ordered of goods in decedent's estate, pending decision as to who had
legal title: Dasent XV 13 (1587); injunctions against waste: Dasent XVII 107 (1589);
XXIV 225, 269 (1593); injunction against disturbance of possession: Dasent XV 121 (1587).
97 Dasent I 29 (1542). This explanation receives some support from a notation in the
margin of the Council Register: "Hanged"; though there is no indication as to who was
hanged or why.
98 Dasent III 244, 312 (1551); XIV 336 (1587); XIX 331 (1590); XX 61 (1590);
XXI 102 (1591).
The aid in collection of debts owed to distressed debtors could be explained as an
additional means of effecting their rehabilitation: Dasent XV 133, 147 (1587); XVI 126;
XXVIII 108 (1589); XXV 46 (1595), the order in this case being directed to the debtors
and instructing them to pay up immediately or appear before the Council " to answeare your
contempt."
The Council's interest in aid to merchants and the orderly conduct of trade may explain
its orders setting aside a debtor's sale of all his assets as a fraud on creditors [Dasent I 69
(1542)]; £nding fraud by a broker in a sale of land to merchants and revising the price term
in the contract [Dasent I 38 (1542)]; directing the distribution to creditors of the assets of
delinquent debtors [Dasent X 15 (1577); XIV 255 (1586)]; impounding a debt due to a
delinquent debtor from a third person [Dasent XVI 130 (1588)]; directing royal officers to
assist London merchants in collecting their claims against an Irish debtor through his assets
in Ireland [A.P.C. 1621-3, 454 (1623)]; apprehending absconding servants and factors
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plain why the Council intervened to enforce the liability of a public
warehouseman for warehoused goods lost through his negligence.00 The
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was similarly invaded by orders
issued to executors to pay legacies and, on the other hand, by aid given
executors in preserving assets of decedents' estates or otherwise helping
in their administration.100 The only subject reserved for trial in the
ordinary courts was disputed legal title to land, though even this reservation may have been felt more as a dictate of convenience than as a
limitation of power.101
In the overwhelming majority of cases the solution adopted by the
Council was not the entry of a final or conditional order addressed to
one of the litigants, but the arrangement of arbitration. The advantages
of this solution were obvious. Even a summary order addressed to one
of the litigants was likely to involve the Council in protracted hearings
if the case was at all contested; this possibility was in fact provided for
by the standard clause attached to summary orders, directing the litigant to show cause to the contrary before the Council if its instructions
were not promptly obeyed. The device of the arbitral commission, on
the other hand, enabled the Council to shelve responsibility for trial
of disputed issues. The letters appointing arbitrators to "hear and end"
[Dasent IX 199 (1576); XII 12 (1580); XXIX 221 (1598); XXXI 75, 117 (1600-1)]; and
ordering a local official to assist two London merchants in searching the papers of an absconding apprentice [A.P.C. 1616-17, 272].
oo Dasent XXV 356, 488 (1596).
for payment of legacies: Dasent XI 69 (1579); XVI 97 (1588); XVII 263
(1589); XXII 267 (1591); XXVI 157 (1596); order for delivery by executor of gold chain
bequeathed to plaintiff: Dasent IX 131 '(1576); arbitration ordered of claims against executors: Dasent XVII 318 (1589); XX IO (1590); aid to executors in collecting assets: Dasent
VIII 391 (1575); order for surrender to executor of will detained by another: Dasent X 23
(1577); arbitration of complicated dispute involving administration of decedent's estate:
Dasent XVII 269 (1589).
101 In BRIT. Mos. LANsn., ms. 160, fol. 147 there appears a copy of an order of May 31,
1603 regulating private litigation before the Council. Unlike the order appearing in the
Council's register on the subject (discussed in a second instalment), this draft recites an
order from the King forbidding the Council "to interrupt the Comon Justice of the Realme
by intermedling with anie Suites that are depending in Courte iudiciall where Righte and
Titles are onely to be decyded and not anie determinacion to be sett downe at the Counsell
Table." The notion that the Council itself accepted some such limitation on its authority is
supported by the earlier revocation by the Council of its letters to the Council in heland,
directing an arbitration of a dispute as to land title; the order of revocation reciting that "in
regard espetially that where there is profe of discentes by offices and matter of recorde noe
Courte of Equitie may by the lawes howld plea of the cause." Dasent XXIII 178 (1592).
On the other side are to be placed the fairly common orders for arbitration of disputes
as to legal title to land: Dasent III 305 (1551); VIII 96 (1574); IX 115 (1576); XIII 51
(1581); XIV 325 (1587); XV 391 (1588); XXVIII 155 (1597); A.P.C. 1626, 23, 98.
No final order after full hearing has been found in which the Council adjudicated legal title
to land, but final orders after full hearing were in any case comparatively rare.
100 Orders
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vecy commonly conclude with the significant phrase, "so that wee will
be no more trobled." The Council's lack of leisure is often invoked as
a specific reason for requesting assistance from the arbitrators appointed.102 In the eighty years for which the record is published, the
number of cases referred to arbitration by the Council musi: have
reached into the thousands. In most of them this solution must have
been successful, for the cases disappear from the Register. The complaints at least were silenced, if the complainants were not content.
Referrals to arbitration cannot, on the other hand, be viewed as
disclaimers of all further interest. In the letters appointing arbitrators
these was also a standard clause requiring them to report back to the
Council if they were unable to settle the controversy, giving their own
conclusions and indicating which party had refused to yield. Such
reports were made occasionally and the Council then dealt further with
the cases so returned. Furthermore, the arbitral commissions were considered to be agents of the Council in the sense that a refusal by
litigants to appear before them could lead to arrest for contempt of
the Council.1°3 When an award was finally rendered, the Council
quite often undertook to compel compliance. The party who refused
to comply might be called before it to explain his obstinacy; this prospect alone must have been terrifying enough to ordinary citizens.104
The Council, without such hearing, might confirm the award and
direct that it be executed.105 Or continued refusal to perform could
lead to a litigant's arrest for contempt of the Council itself.106
These measures to maintain the authority of the arbitral commissions were justified by the importance of arbitration as a technique of
Tudor judicial administration. Its advantages went far beyond the
102Dasent XI 123 (1579); XII 359 (1581); XIII 44, 51, 321 (1581-2); XIV 117, 296,
329 (1586-7); XV 82 (1587); XXX 706 (1600); A.P.C. 1621-3, 13 (1621).
10a Dasent XX 49 (1590); XXI 82, 363 (1591); XXV 396 (1596); A.P.C. 1623-5,
190 (1624). In A.P.C. 1613-14, 605 (1614), refusal to appear before arbitrators merely

led to an order to the litigant to come before the Council to explain his conduct.
104 Orders directing parties to perform awards or appear before the Council: Dasent VII

311 (1565); VIII 354 (1574); X 47 (1577); XII 55 (1580); XV 29 (1587); XIX 103
(1590); XX 294, 355 (1591); XXX 404 (1600); A.P.C. 1618-19, 23i (1618). In Dasent
I 492 (1546); X 176 (1578); XI 114 (1579); XIV 259 (1586); XIX 73 (1590), the

parties who had refused to perform arbitral awards promptly submitted and agreed to perform,
when actually called before the Council.
,
105 Dasent I 540 (1546); XIV 162, 248 (1586); XVII 257 (1589); XVIII 259 (1589);
XX 355 (1591); XXX 404 (1600); A.P.C. 1613-14, 377 (1614); A.P.C. 1616-17, 169
(1617).

106Nicolas VII 258 (1541); XVill 91 (1589); XIX 172,263 (1590); XXI 82,234
(1591); XXII 30 (1591); xxm 101 (1592); A.P.C. 1618-19, 307 (1618); A.P.C.
1621-3, 242 (1622).
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saving of time for the members of the Council, important as that saving
was to very busy men. It saved time and costs for the litigants. It
promised a "frendlye ende" to quarrels and thereby contributed something to internal peace and social cohesion.107 Its most important advantage was that it enlisted the judgment and the inHuence of laymen
in the administration of prerogative justice, and especially of prerogative equity. The doctrines of the equity courts had not yet been processed by lawyers' logic, though their main outlines were well known
to informed laymen. The ultimate sanction for these doctrines was
political authority, but their appeal in detail was to common sense
judgment, which the results of the common law system so B.agrantly
contradicted. The device of arbitration by commissions of laymen made
it possible to find specific solutions that were practical and sensible
and that also conformed to the ethical standards prevailing in society.
Throughout all phases of Tudor equity arbitration was common and,
one may say, preferred. It was freely used in the Chancery and Court
of Requests and even, it seems, in the Star Chamber.108 To a remarkable extent the equity of the Tudor period was a kind of popular equity,
in the sense that it relied through arbitral commissions on the practical
aid and the practical morality of selected groups of responsible laymen.
In the work of the Privy Council it was clear that this aid was a principal reliance. The energies and abilities of an emerging middle class,
which were being called upon for the work of local government and
for many other kinds of national service, were enlisted for a further
great contribution in adjusting private law to the needs and the consciences of laymen in the community.
The significance of arbitration in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries can be suggested in another way, through the prominence of the common lawyers in administering the system. The Council
107 Apparently the Council was not being disingenuous in directing arbitration of a
case already pending before the Chancery in Ireland, when it stated that the object of the
order was not to bring "mistrust" of the Irish Chancellor's proceedings but to take advantage
of the consent of the parties "for this good meanes to be used." Dasent XIV 289 (1587).
An entry, among many, that reHects the pressure placed on the parties to submit to arbitration is the mortgage redemption case reported in Dasent XIV 234 (1586). There were of
course some cases in which the Council itself undertook to arbitrate and entered in the
Council Register its own final award: Nicolas VII 87 (1540); Dasent I 138 (1543); II 133
(1547); XI 101, 294 (1579); XVI 56 (1588).
108 HtmsoN, STAR CHAMBER 19-20, in 2 HARGRAVE, CoLLECTANEA JORIDICA, refers
to the practice in the Star Chamber of referring cases "to judges and divers of the presence"
to end by consent of the parties if they could or otherwise to certify. Hudson himself commends this practice and offers only the criticism that in very recent times a new practice
had developed of referring to such arbitrators with final power of disposition.
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needed much legal advice and constantly secured it, through inquiries
addressed to the common law judges or the law officers of the Crown.
On the other hand no common lawyers (other than the Chancellor)
sat ordinarily as members of the Council, except when it was organized
as the Court of Star Chamber. The very large numbers of common
lawyers included in arbitral commissions were appointed on the same
terms as the laymen. They were requested to "hear and end" according
to equity, to bring the parties to a "frendlye ende" or to a "charytable
composicion." The Chief Justices of the King's Bench and Common
Pleas were frequently named, either alone or in company with other
common law judges.109 Individual common law judges were named
with other persons, la,vyers or laymen; the Attorney General and
Solicitor General frequently appear; and all of them in almost every
conceivable combination.11 ° Coke himself, both before and after his
tenure of judicial office, was a member or chairman of such commissions.111 In some instances the issues appeared to be purely legal and
109The Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench: Dasent IX 281 (1577); XIII 146, 321
(1582); XIX 125 (1590); XXII 531 (1592); XXX 253 (1600); XXXI 463 (1603); A.P.C.
1623-5, 479 (1625); the two Chief Justices: DasentXX 245, 283 (1591); XXX 605 (1600);
the two Chief Justices, the Chancellor and the Lord Treasurer: Dasent XVI 252 (1588);
the two Chief Justices, the Attorney General and Solicitor General: Dasent X 89 (1577);
the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and another common law judge: Dasent XXIV 231
(1593); the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, one
judge and one Baron of the Exchequer: Dasent XVI 107 (1588).
110 The most common assignments were to the local Justices of Assize, for the sake of
their knowledge of local personalities and local conditions: Dasep.t IX 158 (1576); XI 69,
73, 120, 250 (1579); XII 67, 261 (1580); XIII 91 (1581); XIV 141, 325 (1586); XV
159, 391 (1587); XIX 271 (1590); XXII 261 (1592); XXV 246 (1596); xxvm 155
(1597); XXIX 409 (1598); A.P.C. 1615-16, 91, 259 (1615); A.P.C. 1623-5, 22, 35, 254.
References to the Chancellor and two common law judges: Dasent VI 72 (1557); to
the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, the Attorney and Solicitor General and the Master
of the Rolls: Dasent vm 399 (1575); to Justice Owen, the Attorney and Solicitor General:
Dasent XXV 145 (1596); to the Chancellor and Attorney General: A.P.C. 1615-16,
659, 666 (1616); to the Attorney General and the Master of the Rolls: Dasent XIV 125
(1586); to the Solicitor General and the Master of the Rolls: Dasent X 186 (1578); to a
common law judge and the Master of the Rolls: Dasent XXII 149 (1591); to the Lord Chief
Baron and the Master of the Rolls: Dasent ffi 423 (1551); to the Lord Chief Baron and a
Master of Requests: Dasent VII 194 (1564); to common law judges in various other combinations: Dasent Vill 95 (1573); IX 33, 108 (1576); XI 64, 330 (1579); XIV 260 (1586);
XV 159 (1587); XVI 130 (1588); XVffi 254, 322 (1589); to the law officers in various
combinations: Dasent VIII 96 (1574); IX 93, 103 (1576); XII 123 (1580); XXI 168
(1591); XXV Ill (1598); A.P.C. 1616-17, 409 (1617); to other common lawyers: Dasent
XIV 99 (1586); XXI 413 (1591). These lists are by no means exhaustive.
111 In 1590 Coke was the chairman of a commission of eight appointed to examine and
end a case of alleged breach of trust of personalty: Dasent XIX 33 (1590). In 1597 he and
the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas were appointed to work out a "composicion" of a
claim by the plaintiff that he had been disinherited by a fraudulent fine: Dasent XXVI 471
(1597). In 1619 Coke was a member, with the Master of the Rolls and two others, of an
arbitral commission named to deal with the claim of eighty "poore clothiers'; who claimed
that a fraudulent sale under a commission of bankruptcy had prevented recovery of money
owed to them. A.P.C. 1619-21, 79 (1619).
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appropriate for common law trial. In many cases, however, it was
perfectly clear that the claim for relief was equitable, and the arbitral
commission was instructed to make an award according to "conscience"
or "equity."112 An even better index to states of mind was the.group
of cases in which the common law judges, on their own initiative and
without authority from the Council, attempted to arbitrate cases of
hardship or inequity that came before them in their judicial capacities,
and where the Council's intervention aimed merely to confirm or reinforce the mediation of the justices.113
This participation of the common lawyers in the process of arbitration according to equity should occasion no surprise. The same degree
of participation was achieved in the Court of Chancery, where common lawyers not only composed the practicing bar and actually shared
for substantial periods, as judges, in the administration of the court,
but where the arbitral commissions likewise made use of common
lawyers as members.114 There was in fact no wide gulf between the
common lawyers and the supporters of the Chancery. The conflict
between Coke and Ellesmere in I 616 was merely one incident, the
most dramatic incident, in a long process of adjustment between the
equity of the Chancellor and the common law system of remedies. By
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the main adjustment had
been made. The common lawyers had come to accept the basic reforms
of equity and to share in their administration. Through the work of
the Privy Council the lawyers were merely given a further opportunity,
under the most respectable auspices, to aid in adjusting private law to
the demands of public opinion.
The question should now be raised whether these activities of the
Council followed any particular line of major innovation. The answer
112 The two Chief Justices and one other common law judge asked to arbitrate a case of
fraud in the sale of land for an inadequate price: Dasent XIV 151 (1586); claim arising out
of a forfeiture of mortgaged land: Dasent XXVIII 402 (1598); claim for goods transferred
in settlement of a debt but worth more than twice the amount of the debt: A.P.C. 1615~16,
259 (1615); and indeed most of the cases cited above, notes 109 and llO.
118 Dasent IX 265 (1577); A.P.C. 1615-16, 169 (1615), the latter case involving an
order compounding the case of a poor widow, entered in the Court of Common Pleas at a
time when Coke was Chief Justice, as Coke himselE certified in a report to the Privy Council.
114 Special commissions appointing common law judges as constituent members of the
Court of Chancery were issued in 1529 (Justice Fitzherbert, the Chief Baron of the Exchequer,
and Baron Scott) and 1591 (Justices Clench, Gawdy, Peryam, and Wyndham). 5 Foss,
JUDGES OI' ENGLAND 85, 474-5 (1857). In S.P. Dom., vol. 244, no. 22 there is a reference
to another such commission in the early years of Elizabeth. From 1596 to 1603 a similar
commission of four common law judges presided on alternate days and issued all the normal
orders in equity cases. The comments made on the activities of the lawyers as arbitrators in
chancery cases are based on a survey of manuscript decrees of the chancery, too numerous to
be cited here.
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is clearly negative. In the development of private law doctrine there
is nothing else to compare with the program of relief to insolvent debtors that appeared well started in the reign of Elizabeth, two hundred
years before its time. It is true that the Council might feel more free
than subordinate officials in urging the equities of individual suitors
or in appealing to motives of charity and pity. The standards of
"equity" and "conscience" were constantly referred to and thereby
given a wider circulation. But the Council was composed almost entirely of non-lawyers. They were the busiest men in England. As the
principal organ of government under the Tudors and early Stuarts,
the Council could not be expected to give close and detailed attention
to the development of private law. An agency for reform, the Chancery,
was already in existence and by the end of the sixteenth century it
had two hundred years of prescription behind it. If the Chancery
had proved incapable, it seems probable that the intolerable rigidities
of the common law would have compelled a new outgrowth from the
parent stem, no matter how strongly the common· lawyers protested.
But real need was not to arise. The doctrines of private law that the
Council enforced showed no marks of major invention. They were on
the whole the doctrines already developed by the Chancery and its
satellite, the Court of Requests. The intervention of the Council
proved rather that these doctrines, and the standards of fair dealing
from which they were derived, had been widely accepted in lay opinion
and had already become an effective part of Tudor and Stuart private
law. The contribution of the Council lay in strengthening the position
of those courts that were most dependent on the Crown's authority, in
supporting their doctrines through the loan of its great prestige, and
in thereby helping to confirm them as working rules in society.
[To be concluded]

